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NOTES 
HEALTH LAW—BAND-AID JURISPRUDENCE: WHY THE RECOGNITION 
OF NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING THREATENS PATIENT CARE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
INTRODUCTION 
I swear by Apollo the physician . . . and all the gods and goddesses 
as my witnesses, that, . . . [i]n purity and according to divine law will 
I carry out my life and my art.1 
For centuries, physicians have sworn to uphold the duties espoused 
by the Hippocratic Oath, pledging to follow a scheme of practice that en-
sures superior care for patients.2  These duties have traditionally been the 
cornerstone of the medical field, providing guidelines for physicians to 
adhere to and ensuring the provision of adequate care to patients.3  In 
modern times, standards such as those promulgated by the Oath are en-
forced through an extensive framework of hospital bylaws, regulations, 
and statutory law.4  Medical peer review committees, comprised of staff 
physicians and nurses, play an integral role in maintaining these stand-
ards by reviewing health care decisions and making privileged and disci-
plinary recommendations at a health care facility.5  Nearly every juris-
diction enforces laws that protect the participants of these peer review 
committees from civil liability to some degree.6 
While simultaneously enforcing these protections, many states per-
 
1. The Hippocratic Oath, NAT’L LIB. OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/ 
greek_oath.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2012). 
2. Id. 
3. See Rodney H. Lawson et al., Credentialing and Peer Review of Health Care Provid-
ers: The Process and Protections, A.L.I 1, 2 (2012) (discussing how peer review has been an 
ongoing part of medical care for hundreds of years). 
4. See infra Part I.A-B. 
5. Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Juris-
dictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 179 (1988). 
6. See, e.g., Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (Mass. 1998) (citing Creech, supra 
note 5, at 179); Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—
Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 28-30 (1999) (comparing the strength of each 
state’s peer review statutes to one another).  Nearly every state has some form of a peer review 
statute on the books.  Lawson, supra note 3, at 11 (stating that “at least 48 states have adopted 
peer review statutes, most of which grant immunity to peer review participants.”); Scheutzow, 
supra, at 28. 
KYLE DESKUS 4/13/15  4:01 PM 
28 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: 27 
mit the tort of negligent credentialing, which allows for an injured pa-
tient to bring suit against a health care provider for negligently granting 
or renewing staff privileges to an incompetent physician.7  The tort was 
first recognized as a plausible theory of recovery in Massachusetts in the 
Superior Court cases Rabelo v. Nasif and DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., Inc.8  In both cases, however, the court only acknowledged the doc-
trine for the purposes of determining whether the bifurcation9 of negli-
gent credentialing claims from the overall medical malpractice action 
was proper.10  Despite only a cursory examination into the plausibility of 
an independent action for negligent credentialing, these two decisions 
recognized that health care facilities could be found liable for granting 
staff privileges to incompetent physicians through negligent peer re-
view.11  Since these decisions, there has been an unsettling silence in 
Massachusetts concerning this tort and how it comports with the laws 
and procedures of the Commonwealth. 
Consequently, legislative action is required to either properly incor-
porate the tort under Massachusetts law or bar it completely.  The tort is 
subject to the many peculiarities of the medical field, such as a highly 
trained workforce and extensive regulatory and statutory guidelines.12  In 
both Rabelo and DeJesus, the courts failed to consider these peculiarities 
in determining the appropriateness of the tort in Massachusetts.13  A leg-
islative solution would evaluate the various substantive considerations as 
well as the broader policy implications of negligent credentialing.14  Un-
til then, the recognition of the tort without further guidance will continue 
 
7. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Minn. 2007) (hearing action for 
“negligent credentialing” where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant health care facility 
was negligent in granting staff privileges to a malfeasant physician). 
8. Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 547, 547 (Super. Ct. 2012); DeJesus v. Milford 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 653, 653 (Super. Ct. 2012). 
9. Bifurcation is the procedure for the separation of a single action into multiple trials 
“in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive 
to expedition and economy.”  MASS. R. CIV. P. 42. 
10. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 548-51; DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 654.   
11. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 548-51; DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 654.  This lim-
ited analysis can be attributed to both courts only discussing the merits of the tort under the 
extremely deferential test for bifurcation under Rule 42 of Massachusetts Civil Procedure.  See 
MASS. R. CIV. P. 42.  The rule allows bifurcation to be left entirely to the discretion of the trial 
judge, and is proper in the interests of economy, convenience, and avoiding prejudice.  Id.  
Individual peer review participants are protected from civil liability as long as they act in good 
faith. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N (2012). 
12. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01 (2012); Lawson, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
13. See Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547-49; DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 653-54. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
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to confuse all parties involved in medical malpractice litigation.15 
This Note argues that the rulings of the Massachusetts Superior 
Court were incorrect, and the ultimate decision to impose liability on 
health care facilities for negligent peer review should be left to the Mas-
sachusetts Legislature.  Section I of this Note provides background of the 
peer review process, the doctrine of negligent credentialing, and its 
adoption in Massachusetts.  Part I.A looks at the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act and the history behind medical peer review.  Part I.B 
discusses the basic organization of medical peer review committees.  
Part I.C explores the common pitfalls of medical peer review.  Part I.D 
examines the basics of the tort of negligent credentialing as adopted in 
other jurisdictions.  Part I.E analyzes the Massachusetts Superior Court 
cases of Rabelo v. Nasif and DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr. Inc. 
Section II of this Note illustrates that the Massachusetts Peer Re-
view Statutes were intended to immunize hospital peer review commit-
tees from liability in medical malpractice actions.  In particular, Part II.A 
shows how the Massachusetts Peer Review Statutes substantially burden 
the discovery process for both parties in a negligent credentialing action.  
Part II.B proves it was the intent of the Massachusetts Legislature to 
immunize medical peer review committees from malpractice litigation 
through the peer review statutes. 
Section III demonstrates how the adoption of negligent credential-
ing would undermine the current regulatory scheme as well as existing 
hospital bylaws and procedures.  Part III.A shows that the extensive reg-
ulatory scheme, promulgated by the Board of Registration in Medicine, 
would be compromised by the adoption of negligent credentialing.  Part 
III.B argues that the current regulatory requirements for hospital risk as-
sessment programs would be compromised by exposing the peer review 
process to litigation. 
Finally, Section IV explores the negative effects of the adoption of 
negligent credentialing in Massachusetts.  Part IV.A illustrates why the 
tort will reduce an already limited pool of healthcare professionals in 
Massachusetts.  Part IV.B considers how the judicial system will be bur-
dened by negligent credentialing actions that will be costly and likely 
unsuccessful. 
 
15. See Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547-49; DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 653-54 (fail-
ing to properly examine the procedural and policy ramifications of negligent credentialing).   
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I. NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING AND THE TORT’S ADOPTION IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
To understand negligent credentialing, it is necessary to examine 
the medical peer review process.  Peer review has been a part of the 
medical community for hundreds of years and is an integral part of the 
health care system.16  Understanding the basics of medical peer review is 
especially important because Massachusetts substantially regulates the 
peer review process and has enacted statutes protecting its participants.17  
This scheme furthers the Legislature’s intent to ensure the highest quali-
ty of health care is administered to patients.18  Once this framework is 
explained, it will become apparent that exposing the medical peer review 
process to the whims of the courtroom will only serve to undermine the 
fundamental purpose for the creation of the system. 
A. The History and Organization of the Medical Peer Review Process 
The tradition of peer review has long been regarded as an effective 
approach to improve the overall quality of work performed in the medi-
cal field.19  The process began to take hold in the United States as high 
demand for hospital care drastically increased the number of health care 
facilities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.20  In an ef-
fort to bring standardization to the quality of care being rendered in the 
wake of this influx, the American College of Surgeons (ACS) was orga-
nized with the purpose of establishing minimum levels of safety and 
quality for the health care field.21  The ACS created the Hospital Stand-
ardization Program, which encouraged health care facilities to enact by-
laws and procedures to maintain adequate levels of care.22  These pro-
 
16. Lawson, supra note 3, at 1. 
17. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 203(c) (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a-e) 
(2012); see 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02-3.14 (2012) (dictating the procedures for medical 
peer review and reporting requirements to the Board of Registration in Medicine).  
18. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained this purpose, stating that:  
Strong public policy mandates the highest quality of care in our health care facili-
ties.  That public policy finds voice in, among others, a strict regulatory scheme 
covering virtually all aspects of hospital operations.  Integral to this regulatory 
scheme is an effective process for self-scrutiny, manifest most prominently in the 
medical peer review process. 
Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Mass. 2007). 
19. Murray G. Sagsveen & Jennifer L. Thompson, The Evolution of Medical Peer Re-
view in North Dakota, 73 N.D.L. REV. 477, 477 (1997). 
20. Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospital’s Physician Creden-
tialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 601 (2001). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 602. 
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grams imposed prerequisites to joining the medical staff at a hospital, 
such as being a licensed and competent physician.23  Hospitals widely 
adopted these standards to benefit from having quality physicians work-
ing in their facilities.24  The modern iteration of the ACS, the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), 
provides further advantages to health care providers, including eligibility 
for state licensing and payments through Medicare.25 
While voluntary adherence to the standards proffered by these 
health care groups was widely prevalent in the industry, the adoption of 
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) mandated 
professional peer review in order to quash a perceived medical malprac-
tice epidemic in the country.26  Although the statute requires the utiliza-
tion of medical peer review, it only serves to impose basic immunities 
for peer review participants and requirements for the reporting of profes-
sional review actions by a health care facility.27  Furthermore, it express-
ly states that: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner 
the rights and remedies afforded patients under any provision of 
Federal or State law to seek redress for any harm or injury suffered 
as a result of negligent treatment . . . by any . . . health care entity.28 
Consequently, the HCQIA does not take a stance concerning negli-
gent credentialing.29  Even so, the statute and its related regulatory 
scheme required states to report information relevant to physician cre-
dentialing to the National Practitioner Database.30  This database, run by 
the Federal Department of Health and Human Services, compiles this in-
formation and primarily disperses it upon request to health care facilities 
for review purposes.31  Health care facilities must request information 
from the database anytime a physician seeks staff privileges at their fa-
 
23. Id. at 603. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. 42 U.S.C. §11101-11152 (2006); Sagsveen, supra note 19, at 479. 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111(a)(1)(D), 11133(a)(1) (2006).  The HCQIA uses the umbrella 
term “Board of Medical Examiners” to represent “a body comparable to such a Board (as de-
termined by the State) with responsibility for the licensing of physicians”.  Id. § 11151(2).  
The information reported to the Board of Medical Examiners must also be reported to the ap-
propriate state licensing boards that are ultimately responsible for the licensing of physicians.  
Id.  §§ 11134(c)(2), 11151(14).   
28. Id. at § 11115(d). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. § 11135(a); 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.01-60.16 (2013). 
31. About Us: Background, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/topNavigation/aboutUs.jsp (last visited Mar. 11, 2015). 
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cility.32 
Massachusetts has also imposed its own reporting requirements on 
health care facilities.33  In particular, Massachusetts has enacted an ex-
tensive regulatory scheme governing the peer review and reporting pro-
cess at health care facilities.34  In order to maintain a level of quality 
care, the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine requires that 
health care facilities establish Qualified Patient Care Assessment Pro-
grams that govern incident reporting and risk management.35  These pro-
grams dictate “a health care facility’s rules, standards, and procedures, 
adopted pursuant to the facility’s bylaws” with the purposes of “estab-
lish[ing] effective programs in quality assurance, risk management, peer 
review, identification, and prevention of substandard practice, and max-
imization of patient care assessment and thus minimization of loss.”36  
Licensed practitioners “may not accept . . . privileges at a health care fa-
cility unless it has a Qualified Patient Care Assessment Program.”37  
Consequently, the privileging process cannot be effectuated without such 
a program in place.38  The regulations require that health care facilities 
ensure that a physician seeking staff privileges is licensed and competent 
to provide satisfactory patient care.39  Ideally, only after successfully 
surviving the vetting process will a peer review committee agree to cre-
dential a physician.40 
B. The Basics of Medical Peer Review 
Medical peer review committees are comprised of licensed provid-
ers who are part of a health care facility’s staff.41  The committee may 
 
32. 45 C.F.R. § 60.17 (2013). 
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 2 (2012) (requiring that the Board of Registration in 
Medicine “shall participate in any national data reporting system which provides information 
on individual physicians.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 203(a) (2012) (requiring that medi-
cal facility by laws contain privileges for reporting). 
34. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02-3.14 (2012). 
35. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(1).  The Board of Registration in Medicine is a gov-
ernment entity charged with overseeing medical reporting, information gathering, and disci-
plinary action in the health care industry.  Id. at § 3.02. 
36. Alan H. Einhorn & Lawrence B. Litwak, Organization, Operation, and Governance 
of Hospitals, 1 MASS. HEALTH AND HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL § 4.13(d) (2011). 
37. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(3). 
38. Id. 
39. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3)(a-d). 
40. Lawson et al., supra note 3, at 9.  But see Charles R. Koepke, Physician Peer Re-
view Immunity: Time to Euthanize A Fatally Flawed Policy, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 11 (2009) 
(stating that physicians participating in the peer review process may act in bad faith and abuse 
the system to forward their own ulterior motives). 
41. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02 (defining medical peer review committees as “a com-
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consist of a small group of designated individuals on staff depending on 
the hospital’s bylaws.42  Their protocol for conducting peer review is 
based on the health care facility’s Qualified Patient Care Assessment 
Program.43  The individuals who may comprise the committee include 
the hospital’s chief of staff, various medical directors, and the heads of 
various departments.44  Massachusetts also requires that at least one 
member of the facility’s governing body sit on every medical peer re-
view committee.45  Credentialing is performed according to established 
hospital procedure that examines a physician’s background, qualifica-
tions, and competency.46  If a physician successfully satisfies the re-
quirements of the credentialing process, the peer review committee will 
make the decision whether to grant staff privileges.47  While the govern-
ing board of the hospital holds the authority for final approval, it bases 
its decision on the recommendations of the committee and “readily de-
fer[s] to the medical staff’s recommendations.”48  Once granted privileg-
es, a physician is able to use hospital facilities to benefit their practice.49 
Typically, medical peer review committees are afforded various 
statutory protections.50  Nearly all states have some form of a peer re-
 
mittee of a state or local professional society of health care providers or of a medical staff of a 
licensed hospital, nursing home, or other health care facility.”); BROOKE S. MURPHY ET AL., 
Medical Staff Issues, AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION SEMINAR MATERIALS at 
pt. 1 (1998). 
42. Dallon, supra note 20, at 609; see QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND PEER REVIEW 
POLICY OF THE MEDICAL STAFF OF REGIONS HOSPITAL, 2 (June 22, 2011) available at 
http://www.regionshospital.com/ucm/groups/public/@hp/@public/documents/documents/cntr
b_028158.pdf (providing an example of how hospital bylaws establish a peer review commit-
tee). 
43. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02; Einhorn, supra note 36, § 4.13(e) (describing Quali-
fied Patient Care Assessment Programs as required in 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(1)(a-e)). 
44. Dallon, supra note 20, at 608-09 (2001).  See QUALITY IMPROVEMENT, supra note 
42, at 2. 
45. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.06(1)(a) (2012). 
46. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(1-3); MURPHY ET AL., supra note 41, at pt. 1. See 243 
MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02 (defining hospital peer review committees as a group of “profession-
al health care providers or of a medical staff of a licensed hospital . . . provided the medical 
staff operates pursuant to written by-laws”).  
47. MURPHY ET AL, supra note 41, at pt. 1; Dallon, supra note 20, at 610.  Possessing 
staff privileges does not create an employment relationship with a health care facility.  Dallon, 
supra note 20, at 604.  Instead, privileges permit physicians to use and admit patients to hospi-
tal facilities and have a voice in the administration of care at the hospital.  Dallon supra note 
20 at 604-09.  In exchange, a hospital is able to organize a staff of qualified medical practi-
tioners to provide adequate care to patients.  Id. at 601.   
48. Dallon, supra note 20, at 610.   
49. See generally id. at 604-09. 
50. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 28-29. 
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view statute on the books, although they vary in detail and strength.51  
These protections offer some form of immunity to individuals and enti-
ties participating in the peer review process, such as protection from civil 
liability or being compelled to testify.52  The intention of the statutes is 
to strengthen the peer review process and encourage participation by 
hospital staff, since peer review is viewed by many as an effective tool 
for improving patient care.53 
C. The Pitfalls of Medical Peer Review 
While medical peer review is often promoted as a noble process 
that improves the quality of health care, it is not without problems.  Phy-
sicians are often reluctant to participate in the peer review process for a 
variety of reasons.54  One reason for such unwillingness is fear of be-
coming involved in litigation.55  Participation on the committee means 
that a physician will be making critical decisions concerning the privi-
leging of fellow colleagues.56  The looming risk of defamation suits, dis-
crimination actions, and malpractice actions is of great concern to peer 
review participants.57  This is exacerbated by the possibility that a health 
care facility may attempt to disclose peer review materials and their in-
timate contents during litigation.58  A member of a peer review commit-
tee would then be forced to bring an action to protect those documents 
from discovery in the litigation against the hospital.59 
Another issue prevalent in the peer review process is the occurrence 
 
51. See id. at 28-30. 
52. Id. at 8. 
53. Id. at 7-9.  “[P]olicy-makers have widely accepted peer review of physicians as es-
sential to encouraging high quality medical practice.”  However, data “suggests that peer re-
view protection statutes do not encourage peer review.”  Id. 
54. See Jeanne Darricades, Medical Peer Review: How Is It Protected by the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986?, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 263, 271 (1992) (stating that phy-
sicians possess trepidation about participating in peer review due to “the possibility of being 
named in a suit for illegal discrimination or an antitrust action because they have participated 
in an adverse peer review determination”). 
55. Id. 
56. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3) (2013) (stating the criteria under which peer review 
committees credential physicians); see Darricades, supra note 54, at 271 (stating that “[t]he 
consequences of an adverse finding in the medical peer review process may be very signifi-
cant to the physician who is censured”). 
57. Darricades, supra note 54, at 271. 
58. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 692 (Mass. 2005) (describ-
ing how a health care facility voluntarily provided privileged peer review materials to the de-
fendant in litigation).  But see infra Part II.A. 
59. See Swatch v. Treat, 671 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (allowing a peer 
review organization to interfere in litigation for the purpose of protecting peer review materi-
als). 
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of partiality.60  Oftentimes physicians are granted staff privileges at a 
health care facility based not on their qualifications but through a politi-
cal game of who they know.61  When a physician on staff becomes in-
competent, their privileges may be maintained purely because of their 
status at the hospital.62  Oftentimes, physicians not privy to these social 
circles of power are inclined to keep silent about glaring issues at the 
hospital in order to stay on good terms.63  Should a staff member speak 
out against the hospital’s ruling circle, they may find themselves brought 
before the peer review committee to be disciplined without cause.64  
These examples of substandard peer review illustrate how the peer re-
view process, often lauded as a noble calling, is rife with problems. 
D. The Tort of Negligent Credentialing 
With the increasing use of peer review in hospitals, negligent cre-
dentialing became a theory of recovery in some jurisdictions upon which 
patients could recover damages from a hospital for wrongfully granting 
or renewing staff privileges to an unfit physician.65  Over thirty states 
have recognized negligent credentialing as an independent cause of ac-
tion.66  To prove negligent credentialing, “a plaintiff injured by the neg-
ligence of a staff doctor must show that but for the lack of care in the se-
lection or retention of the doctor, the doctor would not have been granted 
staff privileges and the plaintiff would not have been injured.”67  In order 
for a negligent credentialing claim to be brought, the plaintiff must suffer 
an actual injury in order to then allege that the hospital negligently gave 
staff privileges to the malfeasant physician.68 
If no injury is proven, then any negligent credentialing allegation 
against the hospital lacks a causal connection to the plaintiff, even 
 
60. Koepke, supra note 40, at 10. (stating that “physicians may manipulate the [peer 
review] process to achieve ulterior motives”). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Is Peer Review Worth Saving?, MED. ECON., Feb. 18, 2005, 
at 2 (2005), available at http://www.peerreview.org/acrobat_files/ispeerreviewworthsaving. 
pdf. 
64. Id. 
65. Schelling v. Humphrey, 916 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Ohio 2009).  Schelling is the Ohio 
Supreme Judicial Court decision that the court in DeJesus used to set the standards of negli-
gent credentialing in Massachusetts, although they referred to the case as “Schilling v. 
Humphrey.”  DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 653, 654 (Super. Ct. Jan. 
18, 2012). 
66. Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 547 (Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2013). 
67. Schelling, 916 N.E.2d at 1030. 
68. Id. 
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though the plaintiff may have been provided health care by a poorly 
qualified physician.69  Absent a negligent act, it cannot be said that the 
physician inflicted a harm upon the patient directly stemming from in-
competence.70  Because an initial case of medical malpractice must first 
be successfully litigated, separating negligent credentialing allegations 
from a malpractice action through bifurcation is often necessary to pre-
vent prejudice and unnecessary litigation.71  This promotes judicial 
economy by limiting litigation should the initial malpractice action be 
dismissed.72  Furthermore, it ensures that the physician defending against 
claims of malpractice receives a fair trial and will not have to defend 
themself in the malpractice action for his past misdeeds.73 
E. The Recognition of Negligent Credentialing in Massachusetts 
The first of two Massachusetts Superior Court cases that recognized 
the tort of negligent credentialing was DeJesus v. Milford Regional Med-
ical Center, in which the court concluded that the doctrine had merit un-
der Massachusetts law.74  In DeJesus¸ the plaintiff, Sidney DeJesus, was 
injured by Dr. Ronald Nasif during an alleged negligently-performed 
surgery.75  DeJesus brought claims of medical malpractice against the 
physician and a claim of negligent credentialing against the Milford Re-
gional Medical Center, alleging that the hospital’s “credentialing com-
mittee was negligent in granting Nasif privileges to perform surgery.”76  
Milford moved to bifurcate the negligent credentialing allegation and 
stay discovery until the underlying claims of medical malpractice were 
decided.77 
 
69. See, e.g,, St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. 1997) 
(requiring proof of malice in the peer review process as a threshold standard to hold a hospital 
liable); Kinney v. Barton, 816 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (finding that an individual 
participant in a medical peer review committee held no duty for the malpractice committed by 
credentialed physician). 
70. DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 654 (requiring an actual injury be proven before liti-
gating a claim for negligent credentialing). 
71. Schelling, 916 N.E.2d at 1035-36.  In Schelling, the Ohio Supreme Court explained 
that bifurcation would be beneficial because it “avoids the problems of jury confusion or prej-
udice . . . [and] also allows a negligent-credentialing claim against a hospital to be dismissed if 
the plaintiff does not prevail” in the initial malpractice action.  Id. at 1037. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 653. 
75. Id.  Dr. Nasif was also the allegedly negligent physician involved in Rabelo v. Nasif, 
the other Massachusetts case that also recognized negligent credentialing.  30 Mass. L. Rptr. 
547, 547 (Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2013). 
76. DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 653. 
77. Id.  
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In DeJesus, negligent credentialing was an issue of first impression, 
so the court looked to the Ohio Supreme Court case of Schelling v. 
Humphrey for guidance.78  The court followed the premise put forth in 
Schelling that separating allegations of negligent credentialing from the 
underlying medical malpractice action is proper because it “avoids the 
problems of jury confusion or prejudice that may result from admitting 
evidence of prior acts of malpractice in a combined trial on both 
claims.”79  An actual negligent injury by Dr. Nasif was required in order 
to establish the chain of causation between the harm done and the grant-
ing of staff privileges by Milford’s peer review committee.80  Conse-
quently, the court ruled that bifurcation of the two claims was proper in 
order to prevent the problems of prejudice and lack of economy associ-
ated with litigating both at the same time.81 
Furthermore, the court grappled with the issue of staying discovery 
until the medical malpractice claim had been adjudicated.82  There is an 
established practice of staying discovery in claims “pending the outcome 
of . . . underlying tort or contract claim[s].”83  Here, the court was con-
cerned that “[a]llowing DeJesus to conduct discovery . . . against Milford 
for negligent credentialing prior to the adjudication of his medical mal-
practice claim would be complicated and wholly unnecessary if a jury 
were to find no negligence occurred.”84  Accordingly, the court stayed 
discovery of the bifurcated negligent credentialing action until the under-
lying medical malpractice action had been decided.85 
In contrast, the court in Rabelo went a different route in recognizing 
negligent credentialing as a plausible theory of recovery in Massachu-
setts.86  The case focused on a separate medical malpractice action 
against the same physician as in DeJesus, Dr. Nasif.87  The plaintiffs al-
 
78. Id. at 654.  The court referred to Schelling as “Schilling.”  Id.  
79. Id. (quoting Schelling v. Humphrey, 916 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (Ohio 2009)).  Schel-
ling required the medical malpractice first be established against the physician for the purpos-
es of causation.  916 N.E.2d at 1035-36. 
80. Schelling, 916 N.E.2d at 1035-36 
81. Id. (allowing bifurcation under MASS. R. CIV. P. 42(b), which grants “[t]rial judg-
es . . . discretion to separate parties, claims, and issues in order to avoid prejudice or in the 
interest of expedition and economy”). 
82. Id. 
83. Id.  This approach was developed from handling unfair settlement claims, where the 
courts first required adjudication of the underlying claims that materially affected the ruling of 
the case before the court.  See generally Kay Constr. Co. v. Control Point Assoc., 15 Mass. L. 
Rptr. 203 (Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2002). 
84. Kay Constr. Co., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 203. 
85. Id. 
86. See Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 547, 547 (Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2013); DeJesus 
v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 653, 654 (Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2012). 
87. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547. 
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leged that Milford negligently granted staff privileges to Dr. Nasif, caus-
ing the hospital to respond by moving once again to bifurcate the trial 
into two separate actions.88  Consequently, the Massachusetts Superior 
Court had to determine whether the tort of negligent credentialing was 
valid under Massachusetts law in order to approve the petition for bifur-
cation.89 
The court deviated from the approach of DeJesus in analyzing the 
plausibility of negligent credentialing.90  Rather than looking to the in-
terpretations of other jurisdictions, the court attempted to find a justifica-
tion for the adoption of the doctrine under Massachusetts law.91  The 
judge derived the doctrine from the already established tort of negligent 
hiring, which imposes a duty on employers “to exercise reasonable care 
in the selection and retention of employees.”92  The court recognized, 
however, that physicians are not typically employees of hospitals.93  
Even with this glaring distinction, the court believed the doctrines were 
related enough to warrant employing the four-pronged test of the negli-
gent hiring doctrine to determine if Milford had a duty of care owed to 
Rabelo arising out of the medical peer review process.94  Using the 
 
88. Id. 
89. Id. (recognizing that “the tort of ‘negligent credentialing’ has not been explicitly 
recognized . . . [but] it has not been found invalid either”). 
90. See id. (relating negligent credentialing to the tort of negligent hiring); DeJesus, 30 
Mass. L. Rptr. at 653-54 (adopting the tort of negligent credentialing through the Ohio Su-
preme Court Case of Schelling, 916 N.E.2d 1029 (Ohio 2009)). 
91. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547. 
92. Id.; Foster v. Loft, 526 N.E.2d. 1309, 1310 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that an 
employer has the duty to use reasonable care in the selection and retention of its employees).  
93. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547.  While physicians may be deemed hospital em-
ployees under concepts of negligent hiring, physicians and other medical practitioners are 
highly educated professionals that merit different treatment under the law.  See Harju v. Knut-
son, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 646, 648 (Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 1999) (finding a hospital liable for negli-
gent hiring a private surgeon whose negligence resulted in a patient’s death); Lawson, supra 
note 3, at 9-10 (stating that medical profession is “composed of individuals with extensive 
specialized education, training, and knowledge”). 
94. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547.  The negligent hiring doctrine requires that a 
plaintiff prove:  
(1) [T]hat the persons whose actions form the basis of the claim were . . . em-
ployees of the defendant employer; (2) that the . . . employees came into contact 
with members of the public in the course of their employer’s business; (3) that 
the employer failed to use reasonable care in the selection, supervision, and re-
tention of the . . . employees; and (4) that the failure to use such reasonable care 
was the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiffs. 
Id.  While it may be argued that the court erroneously used the negligent hiring doctrine to 
serve as a foundation for the recognition of the doctrine of negligent credentialing as a result 
of the specialized, professional nature of the medical industry, that discussion is outside of the 
scope of this note.  See Lawson, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that medical profession is “com-
posed of individuals with extensive specialized education, training, and knowledge”). 
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standards of negligent hiring as a foundation, the court determined that 
negligent credentialing was “cognizable under Massachusetts law.”95  
However, they denied bifurcation due to a lack of evidence by either par-
ty that continuing litigation as a single trial would result in prejudice.96 
As in DeJesus, the court addressed the issues of discovery that ac-
company a claim of negligent credentialing for the purposes of determin-
ing whether bifurcation would be proper.97  The court recognized that 
caution would be necessary in handling the discovery of such cases be-
cause evidence of a physician’s involvement in past malpractice litiga-
tion could be brought forth in a credentialing action.98  Such an admis-
sion could instill in a jury the presumption that the physician was also 
negligent in the current malpractice action, causing undue prejudice.99  
However, Milford Regional Hospital failed to show any prejudice that 
would justify the bifurcation of the trial into two actions, so the motion 
was quashed.100  Though the court recognized the plausibility of an ac-
tion for negligent credentialing in Massachusetts, they openly admitted 
that “the ‘applicability’ of the peer review statute[s] meant discovery . . . 
would be complicated.”101  While the complex procedural aspects of the 
tort were clearly recognized, the court failed to offer even a meaningful 
discussion of whether negligent credentialing should be adopted under 
Massachusetts law in light of the protections given to peer review com-
mittees by statutes.102 
II. THE RECOGNITION OF NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING IS IMPROPER 
UNDER MASSACHUSETTS LAW 
The lower courts in Rabelo and DeJesus failed to take into account 
the extensive statutory scheme that protects medical peer review com-
mittees in Massachusetts.103  This scheme immunizes the work product 
 
95. Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 548. 
96. Id. at 548-49. 
97. Id. (discussing the admissibility of the evidence needed to successfully prove a neg-
ligent credentialing claim). 
98. Id. at 549 (stating that the judge must examine the “danger[s] of unfairness, confu-
sion, and undue expenditure of time in the trial of collateral issues”). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. (agreeing with the court in DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. 
Rptr. 653 (Super. Ct. 2012)). 
102. Id. at 547. 
103. See id. at 547, 549 (relating negligent credentialing to the tort of negligent hiring in 
only a few sentences without exploring the relation further and recognizing that the peer re-
view statutes could pose complications in litigation); DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr at 654 (adopt-
ing the tort of negligent credentialing through the Ohio Supreme Court Case of Schelling v. 
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of the committees and burdens plaintiffs with immense roadblocks to the 
material required to prove their cases.104  The framework also imposes 
significant hurdles for a defendant health care facility when faced with a 
prima facie case of negligent credentialing.105  The recognition of the 
claim also contradicts the intent that the Massachusetts Legislature and 
the Board of Registration in Medicine had in creating these protections 
that medical peer review committees enjoy.106  Accordingly, negligent 
credentialing does not have a place under Massachusetts law. 
A. The Massachusetts Peer Review and Medical Malpractice Statutes 
Unduly  Burden Both Parties in a Negligent Credentialing Action 
The statutory scheme in Massachusetts offers extensive privileges 
to medical credentialing committees to foster effective peer review.107  
State law specifically defines medical peer review committees as “pro-
fessional societ[ies] of healthcare providers . . . provided the[ir] medical 
staff operates pursuant to written bylaws . . . which . . . has as [their] 
function the evaluation or improvement of the quality of health care.”108  
These committees perform their credentialing duties by examining cases 
where a practitioner may not have followed the applicable standards of 
care, instances where a practitioner may not be fit to perform their du-
ties, and cases involving substance abuse.109  Actively engaging in the 
open criticism of their peers’ work performance allows honest discussion 
about remedying problems and educating staff.110  These protections fur-
 
Humphrey, 916 N.E.2d 1029 (Ohio 2009) without considering the tort’s application to Massa-
chusetts law).  
104. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a) (2012) (protecting the work product of 
medical peer review committees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N (2012) (granting immun-
ities to individual participants of peer review committees). 
105. James W. Gustafson Jr. & Thomas D. Masterson, Challenging Hospitals That Tol-
erate Incompetent Doctors, 39 TRIAL 18, 23 (May 2003). 
106. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01(1) (2012) (stating that the goal of the legislature was 
to “provid[e] extensive safeguards of confidentiality, immunity and privilege for . . . internal 
reviews”); Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 11, 17-18 (Mass. 2007) (“That [sic] pub-
lic policy finds voice in, among others, a strict regulatory scheme covering virtually all aspects 
of hospital operations.  Integral to this regulatory scheme is an effective process for self-
scrutiny, manifest most prominently in the medical peer review process.”). 
107. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a) (protecting the work product of medical 
peer review committees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N (granting immunities to individu-
al participants of peer review committees). 
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 1 (2012). 
109. Id. 
110. Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 910 N.E.2d 898, 904 (Mass. 
2009) (quoting Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 18 (stating that the purpose of medical peer review is 
“[t]o ‘promote candor’ and ‘foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider’s 
peers’”)); Francis v. U.S., No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 31, 2011) (illustrating that failure to promote open and honest discussions in the peer 
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ther the public interest of improving the quality of health care in Massa-
chusetts.111  Accordingly, recognition of negligent credentialing in Mas-
sachusetts is not in the public interest and undermines the statutory 
scheme intended to ensure quality medical peer review.112 
The medical peer review privilege in Massachusetts is considered to 
be one of the more protective in the country.113  Chapter 111, section 
204(a) of the Massachusetts General Laws specifically exempts “the 
proceedings, reports and records” of medical peer review committees 
from discovery.114  These documents are not admissible in any formal 
court proceeding, including medical malpractice actions.115  Yet, any 
documents or reports arising out of bad faith participation in the peer re-
view process are admissible as evidence.116  However, the Legislature 
only intended this exception for licensed professionals who were treated 
unfairly in the peer review process itself and provided the recourse for 
when the proceedings of the committee were tainted.117 
The decisions in Rabelo and DeJesus118 should have discussed the 
medical peer review statutes and how the adoption of negligent creden-
tialing would fit within the legislative scheme.  The express, unambigu-
ous language of the statute makes any such action a daunting challenge 
to both parties as a result of the drastic protections medical peer review 
committees enjoy from the discovery process.119  The work product of 
 
review process “significantly impair[s]” that ability of a hospital to correct problems, educate 
practitioners, and take disciplinary action). 
111. Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (stating the general purpose of medical peer re-
view committees). 
112. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 692 n. 28 (Mass. 2005) 
(finding that exposing the peer review process to litigation “would significantly undermine the 
effectiveness of the statute.  Physicians could hardly be expected to volunteer information, or 
express honest opinions, if the confidentiality of their comments could be waived after the 
peer review process were completed and . . . used as evidence in a lawsuit . . . .”). 
113. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 60 (ranking the Massachusetts peer review privilege as 
“medium-high”). 
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204(a) (2012). 
115. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(2) (2006). 
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N (2012). 
117. Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d, 18-19 (Mass. 2007) (finding that “[t]he 
Legislature has permitted the subject of a medical peer review to pierce the statutory privilege 
to establish a cause of action against the member of a peer review committee for the member’s 
failure to act in good faith pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 85N (1993) . . . [However], failure to act 
in good faith must be construed narrowly to preserve the purposes of the peer review privilege 
to promote good health care”). 
118. See generally Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 547 (Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2012); 
DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 653 (Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2012) (omit-
ting any analysis of how negligent credentialing would fit under the legislative scheme of 
Massachusetts). 
119. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204 (protecting the work product of medical peer 
review committees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2013) (requiring that the Board col-
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peer review committee is off limits to any party in an action for negli-
gent credentialing in Massachusetts.120  For plaintiffs, this poses an in-
timidating challenge.  They must establish “that but for the lack of care 
in the selection or retention of the doctor, the doctor would not have 
been granted staff privileges, and the plaintiff would not have been in-
jured.”121  This is burdensome considering that medical malpractice must 
first be proven before attempting to litigate negligent credentialing.122 
In particular, establishing a “lack of care” poses a problem because 
only the statutorily protected work product of a peer review committee 
will conclusively indicate the rationale behind the ultimate decisions to 
grant staff privileges.123  A plaintiff will be forced to establish, by using 
sources other than peer review materials, that a physician was so unqual-
ified that he could only be granted staff privileges through a lack of 
care.124  This can be proven through the publically available “original 
source” materials within the Board of Registration in Medicine’s data-
base.125  These materials are used by medical peer review committees to 
illustrate the practice history and credentials of a physician for the pur-
poses of granting staff privileges.126  This database collects information 
concerning a physician’s involvement in past malpractice cases, educa-
 
lect pertinent information regarding a physician’s competence “that shall be available for dis-
semination to the public”); Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24 (discussing that if a plaintiff 
can establish a physician’s poor credentials, “the hospital will be unable to defend itself as it 
watches the plaintiff present his or her case”); Lawson, supra note 3, at 124 (stating that 
“[i]ronically, if a plaintiff is able to make a prima facie claim of negligent credentialing with-
out the physician’s credential file, the defendant hospital may be put in the position of having 
to waive the privilege to defend itself”). 
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N 
(2012).  The only material that is not privileged is information from original sources that hap-
pens to be presented to the peer review committee and the testimony of peer review partici-
pants to matters unrelated to the peer review process.  § 204(b).  If a person is a participant of 
the medical peer review committee of a charitable organization, they enjoy total immunity, 
regardless of whether they acted in good faith in carrying out their duties.  § 85N. 
121. Schelling v. Humphrey, 916 N.E.2d. 1029, 1033 (Ohio 2009). 
122. See id. 
123. See generally Swatch v. Treat, 671 N.E.2d. 1004, 1006 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) 
(protecting the report and materials of a peer review committee that were critical of the actions 
of a clinical social worker). 
124. Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24. 
125. Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 310 (Minn. 2007) (finding that a plaintiff 
submit “original source” materials to prove negligent credentialing); see Vranos v. Franklin 
Med. Ctr., 662 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Mass. 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2013) (requir-
ing that the Board collect pertinent information regarding a physician’s competence “that shall 
be available for dissemination to the public”); see Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24 (dis-
cussing that if a plaintiff can establish a physician’s poor credentials, “the hospital will be un-
able to defend itself as it watches the plaintiff present his or her case”). 
126. See Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24. 
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tion, any past criminal activity, and any known substance abuse.127  A 
plaintiff can utilize this and other information if it suggests that a physi-
cian had deficient credentials when granted staff privileges.128  However, 
the nature of these materials is likely sufficient only when the physician 
in question has a substantial history of actions undermining any pre-
sumption of competence.129  Consequently, murkier negligent credential-
ing cases will arise where this information is insufficient or nonexistent 
and parties will be greatly burdened by the statutory bar on access to 
peer review materials.130 
While the Massachusetts peer review privilege imposes a signifi-
cant burden on a plaintiff in successfully proving their case for negligent 
credentialing, defendants face equally serious challenges.  As stated, 
plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case of negligent credentialing 
through the materials available to the public on the Board of Registration 
in Medicine’s database.131  Oftentimes, this forces a defendant hospital 
to waive the peer review privilege to counteract this evidence or simply 
watch helplessly as the plaintiff proves their case.132  The health care fa-
cility’s hand is effectively forced because the rationale behind granting 
the malfeasant physician staff privileges lies within the protected work 
product of the peer review committee.133  It is only within these materials 
that a defendant can hope to show that they were not negligent in grant-
ing staff privileges to a physician with a dubious track record.134 
However, Massachusetts does not allow a health care facility to 
waive the peer review evidentiary privilege.135  In Swatch v. Treat, a 
medical review committee was permitted to intervene in litigation to 
 
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2013). 
128. See id.; Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24; Lawson, supra note 3, at 124.  Other 
information includes past court documents, insurance records, the Joint Commission’s creden-
tialing standards, newspaper articles, advertising geared towards the quality of care provided 
at the hospital, and state licensure records.  Gustafson, supra note 105, at 24.   
129. See Gustafson, supra note 105, at 24 (listing various sources where evidence of a 
physician’s qualifications may be found).  
130. See id. 
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2013) (requiring that the Board collect perti-
nent information regarding a physician’s competence “that shall be available for dissemination 
to the public”); Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24 (discussing that if a plaintiff can establish 
a physician’s poor credentials, “the hospital will be unable to defend itself as it watches the 
plaintiff present his or her case”); Lawson, supra note 3, at 124 (stating that “[i]ronically, if a 
plaintiff is able to make a prima facie claim of negligent credentialing without the physician’s 
credential file, the defendant hospital may be put in the position of having to waive the privi-
lege to defend itself.”). 
132. Gustafson, supra note 105, at 23-24. 
133. Id. 
134. See id. 
135. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 692 n. 28 (Mass. 2005).   
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prevent the disclosure of privileged materials.136  The action revolved 
around the alleged negligence of Treat, a licensed clinical social work-
er.137  Prior to the initiation of litigation, both the plaintiff and defendant 
appeared before the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), a 
professional organization that conducted a hearing and subsequently 
produced a report critical of the defendant’s actions.138  When Swatch 
submitted as evidence the report and hearing materials during the medi-
cal malpractice tribunal, the NASW moved to intervene into the litiga-
tion to prevent the disclosure of the materials under the Massachusetts 
peer review privilege.139 
The NASW was granted appellate review after the trial judge be-
lieved that the medical peer review privilege had been waived because 
both parties had participated in the hearing.140  The Massachusetts Court 
of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the peer review privilege 
was one that could not be waived.141  This was justified because “[t]he 
ability of committee members to speak with candor and the willingness 
of persons called before them to be equally forthright would be seriously 
hampered by public release of proceedings or reports of the peer review 
body.”142  Furthermore, if privileged materials make their way into liti-
gation, a peer review committee has the right to intervene to protect the 
information.143 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court effectively agreed with 
the holding in Swatch when they decided Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer 
Institute.144  In dicta, the court indicated that the defendant’s sharing of 
peer review materials was incorrect and could not constitute a waiver of 
the privilege.145  The privilege itself is unrelated to maintaining confi-
dentiality between the parties of a suit but is meant to protect and facili-
tate medical peer review.146  The court believed that applying waiver 
principles to the privilege “would significantly undermine the effective-
ness of the statute . . . [and that] [p]hysicians could hardly be expected to 
volunteer information, or express honest opinions, if the confidentiality 
of their comments could be waived after the peer review process were 
 
136. Swatch v. Treat, 671 N.E.2d 1004, 1007-08 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
137. Id. at 1005-06. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1006. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 1007. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1008. 
144. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 692 (Mass. 2005).   
145. Id. at 692 n.28. 
146. Id. 
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completed and . . . used as evidence in a lawsuit.”147  Essentially, the 
guarantees of confidentiality encourage physicians to effectively critique 
their peers without fear of reprisal or liability.148 
As indicated in Ayash and Swatch, the medical peer review privi-
lege cannot be waived by a defendant in a negligent credentialing action 
because the peer review process is viewed by the higher Massachusetts 
courts as a sacred process deserving of protection.149  Allowing a de-
fendant to waive the privilege in a negligent credentialing action would 
expose these materials, undercutting the statutory protections put in 
place to mitigate the fears of licensed hospital staff who participate in 
peer review.150  The consequence of this bar on waiving the privilege is 
that non-negligent health care facilities may be found liable for creden-
tialing a physician with a negative past.151  It is possible that such a facil-
ity’s peer review committee had rational justifications for granting staff 
privileges to a physician even in the face of a questionable resume.152 
The fact that current Massachusetts law would permit a circum-
stance where a non-negligent hospital would be held liable for a tort that 
it did not commit based solely on an inference derived from a physi-
cian’s past credentials is excessively unjust.  Negligent credentialing 
contradicts the extreme deference that Massachusetts has shown for 
medical peer review;153 one that is so substantial that it permits peer re-
view committees to intervene in litigation for the sole purpose of protect-
ing their work product.154  The undue burdens placed on the parties in-
volved in a negligent credentialing action only further support the notion 
that it was wrong to recognize the doctrine without further analysis.155  
 
147. Id. 
148. See id. 
149. See id.; Swatch, 671 N.E.2d at 1008. 
150. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.01 (2012) (stating that the purpose of the peer re-
view statutes is to “provide[] extensive safeguards of confidentiality, immunity and privilege 
for both internal reviews and reports to the Board” in order “[t]o assure free self-examination 
by physicians and institutions”). 
151. See supra pp. 28-29. 
152. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2013).  The information required to be col-
lected by statute is not necessarily indicative of a physician’s current competency.  People pay 
their debts to society for past crimes and become upstanding citizens, they may overcome past 
issues with drug addiction, and they may make efforts to improve their skills to become com-
petent in their trade.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(a-e) (giving the Board of Registra-
tion the ability to organize remediation programs to retrain or rehabilitate physicians in lieu of 
disciplining them for wrongful acts).  
153. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 692 n.28 (Mass. 2005); 
Swatch, 671 N.E. 2d at 1007-08. 
154. Swatch, 671 N.E.2d at 1007. 
155. See Rabelo, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 547-49; DeJesus, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 653-54 
(failing to substantially examine the effects of adopting).   
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Any decision altering the state of medical peer review should be left to 
the Legislature and not to the rationale of the judiciary, which may not 
consider the depth of the issue. 
B. Recognition of the Tort of Negligent Credentialing Undermines the 
 Legislative Intent of the Peer Review Statutes 
The entire purpose of the peer review statutes is to immunize the 
process from potential litigation, which would undermine open discus-
sion and criticism.156  A physician will be less likely to participate in the 
peer review process if his work product is exposed through litigation.157  
Medical peer review committees exist and enjoy statutory protections 
because they “identify problems in practice before they occur and . . . put 
in place preventive measures designed to minimize . . . substandard prac-
tice.”158  These protections ensure that medical malpractice will be re-
duced and “an atmosphere of mutual trust between physicians and their 
patients” will be fostered.159 
The intent of the Massachusetts Legislature in enacting the peer re-
view statutes is explained in the Supreme Judicial Court case Vranos v. 
Franklin Medical Center.160  In Vranos, the Plaintiff physician moved to 
compel discovery of peer review materials to support his allegations of 
malicious peer review.161  His staff privileges had been suspended after 
various occurrences of violent and disruptive behavior with his peers.162  
Vranos applied for appellate review of whether the communications of a 
medical peer review committee were discoverable under chapter 111, 
section 204(a) of the Massachusetts General Laws.163 
In determining whether such documents should be discoverable in 
instances of alleged bad faith peer review, the Supreme Judicial Court 
reviewed the legislative purpose behind the peer review protections.164  
The Court explained that the protections were created due to strong pub-
lic desire for the provision of the highest quality of health care to pa-
tients in Massachusetts.165  This is accomplished through “a strict regula-
tory scheme covering virtually all aspects of hospital operations,” 
 
156. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01(1). 
157. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 692 n.28; Swatch, 671 N.E.2d at 1007; Creech, supra note 4, 
at 179. 
158. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01(1). 
159. Id. 
160. Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 11 (2007). 
161. Id. at 16-17.   
162. Id. at 14-15. 
163. Id. at 17. 
164. Id. at 17-18.  
165. Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 11, 17 (2007). 
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including “an effective process for self-scrutiny, manifest[ed] most 
prominently in the medical peer review process.”166  The immunities 
granted “foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider’s 
peers.”167  In essence, the Massachusetts Legislature deferred to the 
judgment of the medical field, protecting them from liability so that they 
could perform the important task of peer review.168 
In regards to the allowance for disclosure when an individual has 
failed to perform his peer review duties in good faith, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court narrowly construed the exception.169  Limitation on the excep-
tion is due to the importance of ensuring high quality medical care, 
which would be undermined by exposing hospitals to liability for their 
credentialing actions.170  A plaintiff must show that the individual acted 
in bad faith in order to obtain the disclosure of pertinent credentialing 
materials.171  An example of a bad faith peer review would be where a 
participant intentionally misled the committee, undermining the integrity 
of the process.172  Any straying from the well-established statutory and 
regulatory guidelines would “severely undermine the Legislature’s care-
fully constructed scheme to promote system wide good health care.”173  
The Legislature clearly believed that the greater good was best served by 
protecting peer review committees from discovery.174 
Effective medical peer review affects every recipient of health care 
in Massachusetts,175 while the allowances of any holes in the statutory 
scheme would only serve to satisfy the needs of the few at the expense of 
the many.176  The peer review protections are so extensive that the Legis-
lature should ultimately decide whether health care facilities should be 
held liable for negligent peer review as they are in the best position to 
 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 18 (quoting Pardo v. General Hosp. Corp., 841 N.E.2d 692, 700 (Mass. 
2006)). 
168. See Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 18; Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1315 (Mass. 
1998) (stating that “the peer review privilege imposes some hardship on litigants seeking to 
discover information from hospital records, but the Legislature has clearly chosen to impose 
that burden . . . in order to improve the medical peer review process”). 
169. Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 11, 20 (2007). 
170. Id. at 19. 
171. Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N (2012). 
172. Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 18. 
173. Id. at 19. 
174. Id. at 18. (holding that “the interests of the general public in quality health care are 
elevated over the interest of individual health care professionals in unfettered access to infor-
mation about peer review of their actions”). 
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 203(d) (2012) (requiring that “[e]very licensed hos-
pital, as a condition of licensure, and every public hospital shall be required to participate in 
risk management programs established by the board of registration in medicine”). 
176. Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 18. 
KYLE DESKUS 4/13/15  4:01 PM 
48 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: 27 
ensure the doctrine comports with existing law.  As the law currently 
stands however, the tort undermines the pre-existing statutory scheme.177 
III. THE EXTENSIVE REGULATORY STANDARDS CURRENTLY 
ENFORCED WOULD BE UNDERMINED BY THE ADOPTION OF NEGLIGENT 
CREDENTIALING 
The purpose of the extensive protections afforded to peer review 
committees in Massachusetts arises out of the concern that exposure to 
liability will undermine the peer review process.178  As stated in Vranos: 
Strong public policy mandates the highest quality of care in our 
health care facilities.  That public policy finds voice in, among oth-
ers, a strict regulatory scheme covering virtually all aspects of hospi-
tal operations.  Integral to this regulatory scheme is an effective pro-
cess for self-scrutiny, manifest most prominently in the medical peer 
review process.179 
The regulatory scheme that protects peer review committees dis-
plays the clear intent of the Legislature to maintain the highest possible 
standards of medical care in the Commonwealth.180  Imposing a new in-
carnation of hospital liability through the tort of negligent credentialing 
only serves to undermine these well-established regulations and hospital 
policies that seek to improve patient care. 
The deference that medical peer review committees receive is a di-
rect result of their specialized knowledge.181  Medical practitioners have 
specialized understanding about topics that a layman legislator unfamil-
iar with the field could not hope to effectively grasp.182  Complementary 
to this extensive pool of unique knowledge is also the fact that the medi-
cal field is constantly changing as a result of technological and proce-
dural advancements.183  The Legislature cannot be expected to maintain 
a current and extensive knowledge of these advancements, so as a result, 
the field has been provided the means to self-regulate.184  In order to ef-
fectively self-regulate, an extensive scheme of mandating risk manage-
ment policies and peer review has been created by the Board of Registra-
 
177. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N. 
178. Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 17-18. 
179. Id. at 17-18. 
180. Id. at 18.  See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01(1) (2012). 
181. CHARLES JOSEF BLANCHARD ET. AL., Credentialing and Peer Review of Health 
Care Providers: The Process and Protections, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 7, 8 (2012); 
Lawson, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
182. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 181, at 8-9. 
183. Id. at 9; Lawson, supra note 3, at 2.  
184. BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 181, at 8-9; Lawson, supra note 3, at 2.  
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tion in Medicine, The Joint Commission, and the self-imposed staff poli-
cies and procedures at hospitals.185  This regulatory framework is threat-
ened by the adoption of the tort of negligent credentialing because expo-
sure to liability undermines the candor of the privileging process.186 
A. Regulations Promulgated by the Board of Registration in Medicine 
 Will Be Crippled by the Recognition of Negligent Credentialing 
The regulatory scheme that governs hospital peer review in Massa-
chusetts by the Board of Registration in Medicine enumerates protocols 
that foster higher standards of care and reduce occurrences of medical 
malpractice.187  Such regulations are only effective when hospital peer 
review occurs cohesively and honestly.188  The regulations require that 
every medical facility have established Qualified Patient Care Assess-
ment Programs189 that designate the procedure for risk management pro-
grams such as incident reporting and peer review.190 
Furthermore, the regulations impose standards for peer review 
committees to follow during the credentialing process.191  These regula-
tions require that “[n]o health care facility in the Commonwealth 
shall . . . grant privileges to a licensee, unless the health care facility first 
completes” the necessary licensing procedure.192  The credentialing pro-
cedure itself is extremely intensive and looks at all aspects concerning a 
physician’s ability to practice medicine.193  It requires that the hospital 
verify that a practitioner seeking staff privileges is actually licensed to 
 
185. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01; Specifications Manual for Joint Commission 
National Quality Core Measures, JOINT COMMISSION, http://manual.jointcommission.org/ 
releases/TJC2013B/rsrc/Manual/TableOfContentsTJC/HBIPS_v2013B.pdf (last visited Oct. 
30, 2013). 
186. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 692 n.28 (Mass. 2005). 
187. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01. 
188. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 8; see 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.04.  
189. “A Qualified Patient Care Assessment Program is a ‘risk management program’ 
established by the Board of Registration in Medicine pursuant to” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, 
§ 203(d).  243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02.  This program consists of: 
A health care facility’s rules, standards and procedures, adopted pursuant to the 
facility’s bylaws (unless otherwise required by statute), designed to establish ef-
fective programs in quality assurance, risk management, peer review, identifica-
tion and prevention of substandard practice, and maximization of patient care as-
sessment and thus minimization of loss, and which meet or exceed the rules, 
procedures and standards set forth in 243 CMR 3.00. 
243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02. 
190. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03, 3.05.  
191. Id. at 3.05(1). 
192. Id.  
193. See generally 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05. 
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practice medicine.194  Also, the physician seeking privileges must pro-
vide a copy of their most recent application for registration to practice 
medicine and report any malpractice claims within the previous ten 
years.195  The information provided to the hospital is then analyzed under 
an extensive set of criteria that determine if a physician is fit to prac-
tice.196 
The regulations also have extensive requirements placed on hospi-
tals in their continued evaluation of already privileged physicians.197  
Hospitals are required to have an established Qualified Patient Care As-
sessment Program198 in which every practitioner given staff privileges 
must participate.199  These programs are instituted to ensure compliance 
with hospital and general patient care procedures, which ensure the 
highest possible standards of care are maintained.200  A licensee shall not 
participate or associate with a health care facility that does not have a 
Qualified Patient Care Assessment Plan in place, signifying that the 
Massachusetts government intends hospital procedure, including peer 
review, to be strictly followed and enforced.201 
High standards of care in the hospital setting rely on honesty and 
candor.202  The information that is considered during the credentialing 
process is of a professionally sensitive nature.203  Participants in the peer 
review process are privy to possibly the most damning and embarrassing 
information concerning a licensee’s professional career.204  From a sim-
ple perspective, this information is not easily discussed.  There is an in-
herent fear that exists in the credentialing process; participants may dis-
close thoughts in apparent confidence one day only to hear it the next 
 
194. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3)(a).  The Health Care Quality Improvement act 
requires that health care facilities obtain information concerning the physician when they ap-
ply for staff privileges.  42 U.S.C. § 11135 (2006). 
195. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3)(c). 
196. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3)(d).  These criteria include: 
[P]rofessional performance, judgment and clinical skills; . . . mental- and physi-
cal status; . . . compliance with continuing education requirements; . . . data deal-
ing with utilization; . . . adherence to health care facility and medical staff by-
laws, policies and procedures; . . . malpractice claims filed against the licensee; 
and . . . information regarding any criminal proceedings. 
197. See generally 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03-3.11. 
198. Supra note 175. 
199. See generally 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03.   
200. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(1). 
201. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(3). 
202. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 7-8. 
203. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3). 
204. See id. 
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day at the water cooler.205  This is one reason why licensed medical pro-
fessionals are afforded staunch protections in Massachusetts that insulate 
hospital policies and procedures.206  The judicial analysis under Rabelo 
and DeJesus lacked these important considerations in adopting the tort of 
negligent credentialing.207  As the current law stands, the tort is in direct 
conflict with the medical peer review statutory scheme and the Legisla-
ture’s desire to extinguish peer review participants’ fears of liability.208  
To solve this legal quandary, the Legislature should determine whether 
the negligent credentialing has any place under Massachusetts law, and 
if so, how it will comport with the existing statutory scheme. 
Allowing negligent credentialing as recognized in Rabelo and De-
Jesus would undermine the peer review system in Massachusetts.209  
Even if the Massachusetts Peer Review Statutes continue to strictly pro-
tect the work product of medical peer review committees, making any 
allegation of negligent credentialing a questionable endeavor,210 the lay 
peer reviewer may not realize this.  The fact that members of peer review 
committees are highly educated individuals does not denote a sufficient 
knowledge of law.211  The mere recognition of negligent credentialing 
will adversely influence medical practitioners in hospitals across Massa-
chusetts.212  The fear of litigation is a very real anxiety that physicians 
face in their profession.213  A failure to take a decisive stand to denounce 
the findings of Rabelo and DeJesus will likely chill the peer review pro-
cess. 
 
205. BLANCHARD ET. AL., supra note 181, at 3 (alluding to a physician’s “reluctan[ce] 
to participate in peer evaluation because of the . . . personal and professional consequences”); 
Steve Twedt, The Cost of Courage: How the Tables Turn on Doctors, PITTSBURG POST-
GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2003, available at http://old.post-gazette.com/pg/03299/234499.stm (dis-
cussing how physicians may face ramifications for their willingness to openly speak of unsafe 
practices or conditions).   
206. See 243 MASS. CODE. REGS. 3.01 (stating that the legislative purpose of the peer 
review protections is “[t]o assure free self-examination by physicians and institutions”). 
207. See DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 653, 654 (Super. Ct. 
Jan. 18, 2012); Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass.L.Rptr. 547, 547 (Super. Ct. 2012). 
208.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204 (2012); Schelling v. Humphrey, 916 N.E.2d 
1029, 1030 (2009) (defining negligent credentialing); 243 MASS. CODE. REGS. 3.01. 
209. See DeJesus 30 Mass. L. Rptr. at 653-54; Rabelo, 30 Mass.L.Rptr. at 547. 
210. See supra pp. 27-28. 
211. Lawson, supra note 3, at 8-9 (stating that “[p]rofessions, by their nature, are com-
posed of individuals with extensive specialized education, training, and knowledge. . . . This 
knowledge disparity is especially prevalent in the medical profession.”). 
212. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d 667 at 692 n. 28. 
213. Scheutzow, supra note 6, at 16; Kenneth R. Kohlberg, The Medical Peer Review 
Privilege: A Linchpin for Patient Safety Measures, 86 MASS. L. REV. 157 (2002). 
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B. The Existence of Hospital Bylaws and Policies Coupled With 
Qualified  Patient Care Programs Already Ensure High Standards 
of Medical Care 
One of the primary justifications for expanding the liability of 
health care facilities through the tort of negligent credentialing is that it 
acts as a safeguard to ensure competent peer review.214  However, when 
the extensive framework of hospital policies and procedures are taken 
into account, it is clear that extending liability to health care facilities for 
negligent credentialing is not necessary to protect patients.215  Hospital 
bylaws, when considered in conjunction with medical peer review, are 
an effective way to maintain high standards of care.216  These bylaws are 
extensive, and credentialed physicians are obligated to follow them, even 
though they are not hospital employees.217  Furthermore, effective peer 
review allows hospital procedures to be changed to remedy problems 
that arise in practice, something that would be diminished with the adop-
tion of negligent credentialing.218 
As part of the requirements for establishing a Qualified Patient Care 
Assessment Program under the Board of Registration in Medicine’s reg-
ulatory requirements, a health care facility must establish procedures that 
include “risk identification and analysis . . . loss prevention and risk re-
duction activities219 . . . [and] patient communications and documenta-
tion activities.”220  These programs reduce economic loss from medical 
malpractice litigation by maintaining high standards in order to reduce 
 
214. See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care 
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 893 (2005) (discussing how allowing malpractice liability is the most effec-
tive means to facilitate the improvement of medical care rather than the use of a purportedly 
flawed credentialing and educational system).  
215. See generally MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204 (2012); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 231, 
§ 85N (2012); 243 MASS. CODE. REGS. 3.01 (2012). 
216. See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 41 (providing various examples of 
sample hospital bylaws, and how they may be altered in order to address various circumstanc-
es). 
217. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(1)(b-d) (2012). 
218. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.02 (stating that peer review, as part of a greater risk as-
sessment program, promotes “quality assurance, risk management . . . identification and pre-
vention of substandard practice, and maximization of patient care assessment and thus mini-
mization of loss”). 
219. Loss prevention and risk reduction refers to reducing or mitigating a health care 
facility’s economic losses from medical malpractice litigation.  See Leonard J. Nelson, III et 
al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 449 (2011) (discuss-
ing how the problem of under-claiming in medical malpractice may reduce a health care facili-
ty’s interest in engaging in loss prevention to reduce malpractice liability). 
220. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(1)(a-d) (2012). 
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the occurrence of negligence.221  The bylaws promulgate practices that 
ensure a safe, professional, and effective work environment.222  For ex-
ample, bylaws will likely contain provisions regarding sexual harass-
ment and degrading treatment of hospital staff.223  The level of a physi-
cian’s adherence to these bylaws plays a substantial role in the 
determination of staff privileging.224 
The double layered protection that bylaws and peer review bring 
should not be intruded upon by the adoption of a new tort without mean-
ingful consideration.  As stated, exposing health care facilities to liability 
for allegedly wrongful peer review will undermine the credentialing pro-
cess.225  Peer review acts as an enforcement mechanism for hospital by-
laws, discerning when discipline and discussion are appropriate.226  In-
stead of seeking a solution through litigation, a more prudent answer to 
prevent inadequate peer review should be designed by the Massachusetts 
Legislature.  A judicial solution, as seen in Rabelo and DeJesus, may not 
contemplate the substantial legislative and regulatory framework that fa-
cilitates effective medical peer review.227  In contrast, the Legislature has 
the power to institute meaningful changes to the system to improve the 
credentialing process that will coincide with existing policies. 
IV. THE ADOPTION OF NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING AS A VIABLE 
FORM OF RECOVERY THREATENS TO UNDERMINE HEALTH CARE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
In conjunction with the statutory and regulatory justifications for 
not recognizing negligent credentialing as a form of possible recovery in 
Massachusetts, there are also multiple underlying public and judicial pol-
icy concerns surrounding it.228  Recognizing the tort will potentially re-
duce the already limited number of medical practitioners in the state be-
 
221. Vranos, 862 N.E.2d at 17; see 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.03(1) (2012). 
222. See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 41 (providing various examples of 
sample hospital bylaws, and how they may be altered in order to address various circumstanc-
es). 
223. Id. at pt. 4. 
224. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3) (2012). 
225. See supra Parts II.B, III. 
226. See 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3) (2012). 
227. See DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 653, 654 (Super. Ct. 
Jan. 18, 2012); Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 547, 547 (Super. Ct. 2012). 
228. See Dallon, supra note 20, at 624 (stating that the high “concern for public safety 
has resulted in a high level of deference to hospital staffing decisions”).  The entire legislative 
scheme surrounding medical peer review, both federal and state, derive this public interest and 
“the need for widespread availability of quality health care services and [a patient’s] oppor-
tunity to choose a physician.”  Id. 
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cause health care facilities will be reluctant to grant staff privileges to 
practitioners without pristine credentials.229  Moreover, an action for 
negligent credentialing has little likelihood of success under Massachu-
setts and would only waste judicial resources.230 
A. The Adoption of Negligent Credentialing Threatens To Restrict The 
 Already Limited Pool of Physicians in Massachusetts 
The adoption of negligent credentialing will burden the privileging 
practices of healthcare providers at a time of a growing physician short-
age.231  Currently, the country has been facing a growing shortage of 
medical practitioners since 2005.232  The United States will face an esti-
mated shortage of 90,000 physicians by 2020.233  The growth in demand 
is so great that the supply of physicians will likely be unable to keep up 
with demand.234 
Demand itself is also drastically increasing, even with this current 
shortage of adequate health care providers.235  Part of the reason for this 
increase has been a result of the Baby Boomer generation requiring 
greater amounts of health care.236  It is undisputed that a growing popula-
tion of elderly will exponentially increase demand as time goes on.237  
Also, the enactment of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will add to the 
demand for health care nationally, with “some projections estimat[ing] 
that over 32 million Americans may become insured under the law.”238  
Even though Massachusetts already enacted health care reform in 
2006,239 the ACA will result in a substantial increase of newly insured 
 
229. See infra Part III.A. 
230. See supra Part. II.A. 
231. 2013 MMS Physician Workforce Study, MASS. MED. SOC’Y 3 (Sep. 2013), 
http://www.massmed.org/News-and-Publications/Research-and-Studies/2013-MMS-
Physician-Workforce-Study-(pdf)/. 
232. Id. at 4. 
233. Id. 
234. Id.  The adoption of the ACA has contributed to increasing the demand for health 
care across the country.  Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” 15-
16 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/S_PPACA_2010-01-08.pdf. 
235. See Foster, supra note 234, at 15-16 (forecasting the number of newly insured in-
dividuals seeking healthcare after the adoption of the ACA).  
236. Physician Workforce Study, supra note 232, at 4.  
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 6, (citing 2012 Review of Physician Recruiting Incentives. An Overview of 
the Salaries, Bonuses, and Other Incentives Customarily Used to Recruit Physicians. (2012), 
http://www.merritthawkins.com/uploadedfiles/merritthawkins/pdf/mha2012survpreview.pdf). 
239. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2 (2012). 
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individuals in the state.240  Demand for health care will rise drastically 
across the country while individuals in Massachusetts have already been 
experiencing market limitations in the wake of their own universal health 
care law.241  As of 2012, Massachusetts has already seen increases in 
health care costs after the adoption of 2006 health care reform law, pay-
ing fifteen percent more than the national average.242 
As a result of this demand, the recognition of negligent credential-
ing will burden the process of granting staff privileges to physicians.243  
Hospital credentialing committees will be reluctant to provide privileges 
to newly minted physicians.244  A new physician lacks the credentialing 
background of experienced practitioners.245  A health care facility would 
be taking a risk in credentialing an unproven physician when the threat 
of a negligent credentialing action potentially looms in the future.246  
Since the tort will make peer review committees consider the likelihood 
of litigation resulting from the future acts of their potential colleagues, 
they will be reluctant to grant staff privileges, particularly to junior phy-
sicians, as a form of self-preservation.247  Negligent credentialing could 
effectively prevent some qualified physicians from obtaining staff privi-
leges at a time when the demand for health care is extremely high.248 
B. Recognition of Negligent Credentialing Will Increase the Number of 
 Frivolous Medical Malpractice Actions in Massachusetts 
A claim of negligent credentialing is extremely unlikely to succeed 
 
240. Id. at 5-6; Associated Press, How the Affordable Care Act will Affect Mass., 90.9 
WBUR, Sept. 30, 2013, available at http://www.wbur.org/2013/09/30/obamacare-
massachusetts-changes (stating that 45,000 previously uninsured individuals will become eli-
gible for MassHealth with the adoption of the Affordable Care Act); see Foster, supra note 
234, at 15-16. 
241. Sharon K. Long, What is the Evidence of Health Reform in Massachusetts and 
How Might the Lessons Learned from Massachusetts Apply to National Health Reform?, 
URBAN INST., 2 (June 2010), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412118-
massachusetts-national-health-reform.pdf; see Foster, supra note 234, at 15-16. 
242. Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Six Years Later, The Kaiser Found, 1 (May 
2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8311.pdf. 
243. Physician Workforce Study, supra note 231, at 8-9 (discussing how state health 
care reform may shorten the pool of available physicians). 
244. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2012). 
245. See id. (requiring information concerning a physician’s practice history be reported 
to the Board of Registration in Medicine).  A new physician will lack this history, making it a 
gamble, in light of expanded liability, for a health care facility to grant staff privileges to an 
untested practitioner.  See id. 
246. See id. 
247. See Nelson, III et al., supra note 219, at 449 (discussing how a health care facili-
ty’s motivations to run loss prevention programs, such as medical peer review, can be influ-
enced by economic factors like expanded civil liability). 
248. See Associated Press, supra note 240. 
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under current Massachusetts law.  Any action for medical malpractice 
against a provider of healthcare must go through a medical malpractice 
tribunal.249  Since the tort of negligent credentialing is attached to medi-
cal malpractice claims, it will also be scrutinized by the tribunal if it is 
present in the initial complaint.250  A medical malpractice tribunal will 
approve an action to proceed if the plaintiff produces “[s]ubstantial evi-
dence,” which the Legislature defines as “such evidence as a reasonable 
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”251 
But the Massachusetts Peer Review Statutes protect the information 
necessary to establish a successful cause of action for negligent creden-
tialing.252  A plaintiff would have to present some sort of evidence to 
even suggest the possibility that a peer review committee wrongfully 
granted staff privileges to an undeserving physician.253  They would be 
forced to utilize the Board of Registration in Medicine’s public database 
that contains records of a physician’s qualifications, education, past 
criminal history, past malpractice history, and occurrences of substance 
abuse.254  Furthermore, knowing that medical peer review committees 
are focused on improving patient care through education and awareness 
of errors, mere evidence of a physician’s past medical malpractice histo-
ry may not be sufficient to establish negligence to a jury without know-
ing the actual rationale the committee relied on when granting privileg-
es.255 
Bringing claims that are borderline frivolous when it is clear that 
the peer review statutes have made them impracticable256 puts an undue 
strain on the judicial system.  Zealous attorneys will allege negligent 
 
249. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 60B (2012). 
250. See Rabelo v. Nasif, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 547, 547 (Super. Ct. 2012) (leaving the de-
cision to bifurcate a negligent credentialing claim attached to a medical malpractice claim to 
the discretion of the trial judge); DeJesus v. Milford Reg’l Med. Ctr., 30 Mass. L. Rptr 653, 
653 (Super. Ct. 2012) (allowing the bifurcation of a medical malpractice claim from a negli-
gent credentialing claim brought in the same action). 
251. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B. 
252. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 204 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85N 
(2012). 
253. Supra Part II.A. 
254. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(e) (2013); Lawson, supra note 3, at 11; Gustafson, 
supra note 105, at 24.   
255. See Creech, supra note 5, at 183 n. 14 (citing Hall, Hospital Committee Proceed-
ings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 245, 248 (1975) (discussing that the 
purposes of medical peer review committees includes providing continued education)).  The 
Board of Registration in Medicine provides a general set of guidelines for peer review com-
mittees to follow when credentialing a physician.  243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.05(3)(d)(1) 
(2013).  However, these standards are very subjective and, within themselves, can only pro-
vide cursory guidance to a plaintiff in determining what to look for in order to prove negligent 
credentialing.  See id. 
256. See supra Part II.A. 
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credentialing against hospitals in order to increase the possible sources 
of compensation for their clients, not to mention the likelihood of set-
tlement.257  However, the low likelihood of success for these claims im-
poses unnecessary litigation costs on the plaintiff.258  The courts are also 
forced to hear these allegations, and the hospitals must pay money to de-
fend against them.  In the case that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case for negligent credentialing, a defendant hospital may be forced to 
pay for damages regardless of their actual negligence because they will 
be unable to mount a defense.259  Considering that plaintiffs wrongfully 
injured during medical procedures will be fully compensated by the neg-
ligent physician’s malpractice insurance, claims of negligent credential-
ing against a health care facility only serve to burden the system.260  
CONCLUSION 
The recognition of negligent credentialing as a viable theory of re-
covery by the Massachusetts Superior Court was shortsighted.  The ex-
tensive statutory, regulatory, and public policy concerns that contradict 
its adoption clearly show that the tort has no place under Massachusetts 
law.  If courts continue to permit these claims, it will disregard these 
overriding considerations and would pose a substantial threat to the sta-
tus of health care in the state.  Since Rabelo and DeJesus, there have not 
been subsequent cases in Massachusetts addressing the doctrine.  This 
may be a result of the numerous unreasonable difficulties litigating this 
tort poses. 
Massachusetts’s courts should recognize these difficulties in any 
further decisions concerning negligent credentialing and should une-
quivocally defer to the judgment of the Legislature.  The lack of any 
subsequent case law is indicative of the difficulty of successfully estab-
lishing an action for negligent credentialing.  The Legislature is best 
equipped to remedy negligent peer review without harming the overall 
credentialing process.  They instituted the protections that medical peer 
review committees enjoy out of concern for the public interest.261  For 
example, section 85N already protects individual peer review partici-
pants “provided that [they] act[] in good faith and in the reasonable be-
lief that based on all of the facts the action or inaction on [their] part was 
 
257. See Gustafson, supra note 105, at 22 (stating that “a negligent-credentialing claim 
can be devastating to both the physician and the hospital” and should be brought when a phy-
sician’s questionable practice history can be demonstrated). 
258. See id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01(1) (2012). 
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warranted.”262  The Legislature can create such an exception to pertain to 
health care facilities and the actions of their peer review committees as a 
whole.263  This would serve to protect the integrity of the peer review 
process while simultaneously providing a safeguard in instances of “bad 
faith” peer review.264 
As the law currently stands, the holdings in Rabelo and DeJesus 
provide an insufficient basis to justify future claims of negligent creden-
tialing in Massachusetts.265  The adoption of an entirely novel avenue of 
liability requires greater analysis than what was performed by the supe-
rior courts.  Furthermore, it encroaches upon the powers of the Legisla-
tive branch, which ideally, represents the best interests of the public.  
The Legislature has the opportunity to create an effective answer to the 
quandary created by the adoption of negligent credentialing.  Until they 
take such action, the decisions in Rabelo and DeJesus recognize a poten-
tial problem, but only act as an ineffective Band-Aid to a greater issue 
deserving substantial analysis and action. 
Kyle Deskus* 
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